L'autore parte dall'analisi dei problemi etici espressi nei linguaggi della poesia, della tragedia e della storiografia, per passare poi alla lettura delle maggiori opere del pensiero antico, fornendo di ognuna puntuali introduzioni. Un'attenzione particolare, alla fine di ogni capitolo, è dedicata all'eredità moderna e al significato attuale dei problemi dell'etica antica, proponendo in modo esplicito un collegamento fra ricostruzione storica e discussione teorica contemporanea.

La discussione sull’idea del buono occupa uno spazio marginale nel libro VI della Repubblica, ma comporta un eccezionale impegno teorico : di qui la vastita della letteratura esegetica che contrasta con la brevita del testo platonico. Il problema cruciale e questo : in Repubblica VI 504a‑509c to agathon non e piu solo un principio di valorizzazione e un criterio di valutazione di cose e condotte – com’e consueto in Platone – ma assume il ruolo di principio ontologico ed epistemologico. Questa (...) posizione ha spesso suggerito interpretazioni di tipo “teologico” dell’idea del buono. Quello che si puo affermare sulla base del testo, e che Platone ha conferito in queste pagine della Repubblica un primato al vertice etico del triangolo i cui altri vertici sono quello ontologico e quello epistemologico ; l’intento e quello di offrire una fondazione etica assoluta, mediante la connessione della sfera del valore con quelle dell’essere e della verita.L’unificazione delle dimensioni etica, ontologica ed epistemologica sarebbe parsa teoricamente insostenibile ad Aristotele, cui si deve una critica devastante alla teoria platonica del buono. (shrink)

L’idea di una comunità politica fondata sulla giustizia rappresenta in Pla¬tone una doppia terapia: quella della malattia della città, che è conflittuale perché divisa in centri privati di interessi e di affetti, e dell’anima, scissa in centri motivazionali opposti che rendono difficile il comando della razionalità. La comunità politica non è un dato naturale o storico, ma un progetto, un costrutto artificiale, cioè il compito di una élite intellettuale . Ma questa comunità si realizza intanto nella pratica discorsiva e nella (...) decisione morale di quanti ne fanno il proprio orizzonte etico-politico.The idea of a political community founded on justice represents in Plato a therapy both for the illness of the city , and of the soul . The just political community is not for Plato a natural or historical fact, rather a project, an artificial construct, that is the task of an intellectual élite . But meanwhile such community exists in the dialogical practice and in the moral decision of those accepting it as their own ethical and political horizon. (shrink)

A proposito dell’edizione della Repubblica diretta e coordinata da Mario Vegetti.

Il faut souligner tout d’abord que Wolfgang Kersting n’est pas un spécialiste en philosophie ancienne. Il s’est occupé plutôt d’éthique et de philosophie politique, en étudiant les théories de la justice chez Machiavel, Hobbes, Kant et Rawls. Son orientation philosophique générale paraît s’inspirer du kantisme et, pour ce qui concerne en particulier les études platoniciennes, il y a sans doute une affinité marquée avec les positions de Wolfgang Wieland (Kersting a étudié, entre autres, à Gött...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone by Bruno CentroneRafael FerberBruno Centrone. La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone. Rome: Carocci Editore, 2021. Pp. 348. Paperback, €32.30.After the death of some of the great Italian scholars who devoted a considerable part of their lifetimes to the study of Socrates and Plato, including Gabriele Giannantoni (1932–98), Margherita Isnardi Parente (1928–2008), Giovanni Reale (1931–2014), and Mario (...) class='Hi'>Vegetti (1937–2018), a new generation of Italian scholars has moved to center stage. One outstanding member of this group is Bruno Centrone of the University of Pisa, who has been productive for decades, even more so in recent years. After editing, inter alia, the collected articles of Gabriele Giannantoni in Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005) and publishing numerous translations with commentary of Platonic dialogues, he has now also written an extensive introduction to Plato's Laws.The Laws is one of Plato's last dialogues. Its main speaker is an Athenian, in whose voice we may discover, at least in part, the voice of Plato. In his soul, according to a saying of Paul Friedländer (1882–1968), cohabited "Socrates and Solon" (Platone [Milan: Bompiano, 2004], 1127). On the one hand, Plato remains a loyal pupil of Socrates in the Laws, one who defends and refines the Socratic dicta that virtue is knowledge and that nobody does wrong willingly (see 731c1–5, 860d1). On the other hand, he lays out the laws for the imaginary city of Magnesia. Hence, Aristotle writes, "Most of the Laws consists, in fact of laws, and [Plato] has said little about the constitution. He wishes to make it more generally attainable by actual city-states, yet he gradually turns it back towards the Republic" (Politics 2, 1265a1–4). Surely, the Laws was also written for "actual city-states," and especially also "for the ears of the younger generation" and the "Guardians of the Laws in charge of education" (811d4–6, trans. Trevor Saunders [London: Penguin Books, 1970]). It is interesting to note in this context that the Athenian starts from an institutionalist view of the law as the "common dogma of a state [dogma poleôs koinon]" (644d3) before proceeding to his own conception of the law as "reason's distribution": "we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what is immortal in us, and dignify this distribution of reason [tou nou dianomê] with the name of 'law' [nomos]" (713e8–714a2, trans. Trevor Saunders with modification).The Third Letter, whether or not it was written by Plato, tells us that Plato had been working with Dionysius on "preambles" (prooimia) (Ep. III, 316a3). In fact, in a passage in the Laws, we are told that the legislator ought to use two methods: persuasion and force (722b6). Force corresponds to the laws themselves and persuasion to the preambles to the laws (prooimia nomôn) (722d2). The Laws contains not only laws, but also prefaces to the laws, which are persuasive in a way that is similar to the discourses of the free physician addressed to his patients, with logoi "close to philosophizing" (tou philosophein engys chrômenon tois logois) (875d2). Notably, the word 'philosophy' (philosophia) does not appear in the Laws, which is not really a "pure" philosophical work and was not intended by its author to be so, with the exception of some passages in the tenth book, where the deus-mensura thesis is stated (716c) and which also contains proof of the priority of the soul (see 896a–d). The Laws represents Plato's descent into the cave.Centrone rightly draws our attention to the fact that Plato, who via Socrates in the famous digression in the Theaetetus recommends the flight from "here to there [enthenden ekeise]" [End Page 325] (176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns... (shrink)

In Aristotle's ethics and anthropology the concept of normality or regularity, nature and norm subtly imply each other reciprocally. The ethical criterium, explored throughout Nicomachean Ethics is that illustrated in detail by the "normal" conduct of the so called spoudaios. The point of contact between normality and naturalness is on the other side offered by the concept of physis, analysed both in Physics and in the biological works. Nature is what happens for the most, i.e. within the field of regularity (...) and legality which characterises its processes. But nature at the same time means telos, i.e. the finality and completion of these processes. What is normal is therefore also natural, and what is natural represents the normative level of phenomena. As for the ethical and anthropological field, the normal-natural human condition, and therefore the law which defines man's perfection, can be traced in the human political nature, i.e. in man's complete adjustment to the model given by the spoudaios. What falls outside this virtuous circle of normality, naturalness and legality is considered a moral deviation, which at the same time constitutes a teratology for and of mankind. Accordingly, conformity to the naturalized public ethos excludes in Aristotle any recourse to the transcendental norm of the "ought to be" which had been one of the fundamental characteristics of Plato's ethics. (shrink)